

merely touches upon ideas – far from exhausting them – they hope it will inspire many further explorations.

Contributors

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Conversation

(KF) My interest in theology comes out of my practice of secular anthropology as well as of Islam. So my forays into trying to understand modern anthropology's vast alienation from theology has in part been a way to face a series of questions that emerge when I try to attend to the simultaneous claims made on my intellectual formation by my academic and 'religious' traditions in conditions of modernity. How do I belong to an academy that tells me religion is a bounded realm within life and a religion that tells me that at minimum it is coterminous with it? Must I sequester my 'religion' in order to pursue scholarship? What might happen if I don't?

These are some of the questions that have occupied me lately and led to my resorting to the category of 'theology' as a way of reapproaching anthropology. My use of theology here is thus strategic, in that I do not aim with the help of theology to reinstitute its truths insofar as it is, and this is crucial, the name for a form of an intellectual inquiry or academic discipline in the Christian tradition.

Perhaps, Ebrahim, you will convince me otherwise; you will convince me that my commitments to theology are alive and well in my writing and thinking if you persuade me that an ecumenical and even elastic sense of theology is at work. But at least consciously, in addition to my particular strategic employment, I remember how theology is the name of a particular discipline in Christianity, and I feel it is important that I retain a memory of the historical unease, or rather scepticism, with its emergence as a science in Islamic history, otherwise known as the 'science of speech' (*'ilm al-kalām*). But perhaps all these equivocations are about my need to stress that I am not writing with partisanship for the theological (as the name of a discipline); rather I am 'using' the theological for ends elsewhere.

I use this category insofar as I find it capable of opening anthropology to 'theistic sediments' of the intellect, which have been subjected to erosion for much of the discipline's history. I am reminded here, for example, of Mary Douglas, a committed Catholic, who expressed a wish of wanting to carve out a 'safe space' for belief within anthropology, or conversely recall Marshall Sahlins, who designated anthropology as a form of 'Talmudic exegesis on the world' in that it consecrated a space for 'non-believers'.⁵¹ How Protestant of him to speak so. My point is that in reaccessing such 'theistic sediments', they can serve as a 'rope' or 'ladder' to get to places we might not otherwise be able to reach within secular strictures.

(EM) Thanks, Khaled, for clarifying your understanding and employment of 'theology'. With my training in Islamic law and theology in traditional institutions (madrasas) combined with religious studies and philosophy, my work is interdisciplinary and attentive to history. Theology in the Muslim tradition, historically speaking, includes truth claims about God but also about sound

forms of knowing. In other words, the questions of theology are about epistemology. How do we know? What are the correct forms of knowing? Theology is normative because it presents itself as the grounds for knowing the truth. The eleventh-century Muslim theologian, rather the polymathic thinker, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) thinks of theology as ‘first philosophy’, a line straight out of Aristotle. Muslim theologians foundationally relied on metaphysical propositions (*al-‘ilm al-ilāhī*) for their truth claims about God and knowledge of the world.

I see this understanding of theology as challenging your claim to lack theological commitments. While you or any other anthropologist might not explicitly write from such a position, I wish to ask: is an anthropologist not interested in truth or discovering the truths held by her subjects? Once an anthropologist explores other people’s meanings and their truths, might she fail to keep a distance between her own commitments and theirs? Her subjects’ truths might force her to question her notion of the truth and, in a self-reflexive move, question her own truth commitments, call them philosophical or theological truths. And why would a reader not be interested in the commitments of the anthropologist and how she views the world and translates the world she is observing? This is, of course, an old debate but takes different forms today.

- (KF) I think you raise a very provocative question, and indeed we should keep in mind that theology has everything to do with truth claims. I see the challenge lying in that at least in the modern academy, including in my discipline of anthropology, theology has been completely banished from evaluations of truth claims, even considered the antithesis of truth, belonging more to the realm of fantasy, if not outright delusion. So for me, to evoke theology is to signal that the question of God remains legitimately alive in the life of the intellect, even giving it a life-enhancing power. This means, and forgive me the Orientalist-sounding metaphor, that it functions like a ‘flying carpet’, in that theology takes or can take us to the edges of thinking, to the edges of speech, to unpredictable beginnings, to what Hannah Arendt would call natality. Through theology, we are able to face the unsayable or the unthinkable as a legitimate part of thinking, and not only by its very nature, but because it stands as an other, an outsider to anthropology.

Imagine looking at American whiteness from the exteriority that is Black America, or looking at Israeli Jewishness from the exteriority that is the Palestinian. What does that vantage point enable you to see that would otherwise remain assumed or invisible? It is in this same sense of ‘outsiderness’ that one can observe how ‘thinking happens’, including the anthropological variant of thinking, with the aid of the theological, its other, so to speak. In other words, and perhaps ironically, theology today, perhaps to the chagrin of reason enlightened along secular lines, appears especially equipped to enable a probing of the conditions of possibility for our thinking (and thinking’s relation to living) in ways that may not be possible under the tyrannies of a secular type of reason.

- (EM) Khaled, your view and use of ‘theology’ is now becoming clearer to me. But it remains unclear as to why you still retain as your working definition that theology originates as an ‘intellectual inquiry or academic discipline in the Christian tradition’. You need not restrict yourself to a Christian definition! You

already referenced *'ilm al-kalām* as the discipline in Muslim thought centred on discursivity and disputation. Here we find contestations about truth claims related to God's essence and divine attributes; how God's omnipotent will is different from God's benevolent purpose; questions about whether the good and the detestable are knowable through reason or if such a determination requires guidance from revelation; how one gains salvation; and the nature of the cosmos and the universe. All these matters and more systematically and over time fall in the realm of *kalām*.

Let's just agree that when I use the term 'theological', I mean the way I define it here, despite the narrow sequencing of the concept in historical Christendom. Modern Christian theology has become expansive at the hands of notable theologians like Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niebuhr, and John Milbank. And, historically, Muslim debates on the essence of *'ilm al-kalām* became quite expansive, especially as it started to bleed into philosophy. So much so that by the fourteenth century the noted polymath and jurist-theologian Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1390) observed that the difference between theology and philosophy by his time was not that significant. Of course, there have been naysayers to both theology and philosophy in the Muslim tradition, precisely because of this cultural entanglement with the Greek legacy, which some thought was helpful and necessary while others felt that the Muslim tradition was self-sufficient and did not need the epistemological insights adopted from Hellenic frameworks, hence the differences in Muslim theologies.

(KF) I am struck by your phrase 'theology became expansive'. Had it not been already expansive? Your observation brings to my mind John Henry Newman's commending theology for its integrative power, placing it higher than other faculties such as philosophy, law, or medicine. I see Newman recognizing in theology an ability to integrate forms of knowledge, an ability not found in these other domains, so the modern university shrunk knowledge by excising theology out of its body.

In thinking about this capacity of theology, I am visited by a sense that theology could be anthropology's staff, as in Mūsā's/Moses' staff. I imagine anthropology, guided by theology's staff, to reckon with itself as an inheritor – historical and thus contingent, to be sure – of philosophy in the West, or, more precisely, anthropology as inheritor of tasks with which philosophy in the West has been charged.

I am aided in these feelings by imagining Wittgenstein seeking to heal us from the bewitchments of philosophy ending up being, in a certain sense for me, an exemplar for an ethnographic investigation on the faculty of thinking, given his focus on 'forms of life'. He illustrates to my mind an intellect (as does Simon Weil in the Catholic tradition, Walter Benjamin in the Jewish messianic tradition, and Ibn 'Arabi in Islam) whose encounter with the Other could help with assessing the extent of anthropology's accomplishment in becoming a 'science of culture': that is, evaluating what was lost and what was gained in acquiring 'scientific' standing in the modern academy.

(EM) I was cryptic in my claim that theology became expansive. What I meant to say was that as the Muslim discursive tradition developed over time, a

multitude of disciplines related to Muslim life from ethics, law, dogma, ritual and practice, astronomy, and the grammatical and rhetorical disciplines all continued to grow, expand, and undergo change due to the encounters of Muslim cultures and societies with different terrains and temporalities. On *'ilm al-kalām*, there is a fervent debate as to whether one really needs ontological and epistemological frameworks to understand the divine and especially the role of the divine in the world. Some believe that the plain and simple faith statements of early Islam are sufficient and do not require reformulation and refinement using 'external' Greek knowledge frameworks. The nominalist Arabic linguistic formulations are sufficient. My point was that Taftāzānī favoured that integration of multiple knowledge forms, which John Henry Newman came to do later in Christendom. So, I was just sensitive to not leave the impression that this expansion of the disciplinary category was uncontested in the past and in the present.

Khaled, I notice a shift in your position from your opening gambit on how you thought about theology as 'Christian' and your lack of a particular theological commitment to your probing questions on how thinking happens. I would say that exploring these difficult questions with the help of normative sources of knowledge – revelation, resources of tradition, history, as well as engaged and embodied forms of reason – does bring one into the realm of the theological.

I acknowledge my commitment to these sources of tradition because they allow me to belong to a tradition and community of knowledge. And in my normative work, I connect to communities of faith and truth based on shared frameworks of knowledge and being. My commitments to other sources of knowledge, modern and ancient, at times happen seamlessly and at other times they arrive agonistically. All this allows me to say how I relate to multiple communities of truth and inquiry. And with this broad template of knowledge, in some ways, I follow the cosmopolitan Muslim tradition. Yet I am aware that the newer and contemporary frames of knowledge and modes of existence also generate aporias and insoluble questions, which force one to probe and wrestle. As the Qur'an, would say, 'Adore (worship) your Lord, until you reach certainty' (15:99). I see my participation in the search and exploration of knowledge as a mode of adoring God that some might express as worship, and what a sublime way of doing so.

- (KF) I appreciate your refusal of walls between 'adoring God' and 'searching' or 'exploring'. It invites us to think of modalities that could populate the dialogic relation, existing or imagined, between anthropology and theology. For a while I have been asking myself about the difference between acts of prayer and acts of ethnographic immersion. To put it bluntly, I have been asking myself: if the dialogue, or if 'translation', happens between the languages of theology and modern anthropology, in what ways might it be right to recognize ethnographic fieldwork as a kind of prayer, or conversely 'prayer' as an ethnographic fieldwork? After all, no secularism seems to have stopped Clifford Geertz from hinting, wittingly or not, at this affinity in recognizing the 'ego-effacement' that fieldwork requires.⁵² In what ways do both prayer and immersion in the field call for the cultivation of the art of 'letting go'? Does not prayer, like immersion, involve potentially at least a 'voyage' or 'depaysement'?

These are some of the questions that arise when I approach theology as 'exterior' to secular reason. I imagine theology as a mirror enabling secular reason to face its conditions of possibility. Two realms of reflection stand out for me. First, theology can be our mirror for asking about who the knowledge-seeker is or might be. Second, theology can be our mirror for asking about where thinking happens. Notice that, for the purpose of our exchange, I am treating knowledge and thinking as synonyms, even though I suspect there are good reasons to refrain from doing that. My attention to this activity helps stress my point that theology need not only work, as is happening in much anthropological rapprochement towards it, to better our understanding of religion. In 'reinstating' this banished form of inquiry, theology might, or so my premise runs, help us regain a certain humility towards all knowledge-seeking.

(EM) If I understand you correctly, Khaled, then I agree with you about theology as a mirror for the self of the investigator and producing a disposition of a certain humility towards knowledge. To say, 'I do not know' is a treasured piece of wisdom. Theology is also one source to identify the location of the one making an inquiry. Perhaps my perspective on the location and self of the investigator resembles yours. I agree with you that there are varieties of knowledge traditions, as well as genealogical approaches, where genealogy is a form of critique. The latter approach, as you fully know, is Foucauldian, is not against the history of knowledge traditions. But I do not view origins as determining a tradition. It is important that we give sufficient attention to the fragility of historical forms. However, I do believe one needs to give an account for changes to tradition and modes of thinking. I am a little bit agnostic about theology as 'exterior' to secular reason, especially when deploying a genealogical approach. Perhaps you would clarify my (mis)reading of your claim. I think of all knowledge as capable of self-reflection and facing its condition of possibility, just as even a simple sign, such as a street name, can provide openings to self-reflection. I am reminded of a fascinating insight of the poet-philosopher of pre-partition India Muhammad Iqbal, who wrote:

The nature of an act, however secular in its import, is determined by the attitude of mind with which the agent does it. It is the invisible mental background of the act which ultimately determines its character. An act is temporal or profane if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity.⁵³

In this vein, I think a theological lens would make the anthropological lens more capacious in the same way that anthropological insights have greatly leavened the study of religion and theology. Those who banish theology from the knowledge enterprise at large do so at a price and they must account for it. It is a prejudice injected into the field of Western religious studies to have kept theology, however sophisticated, out of the knowledge equation on the part of a few gatekeepers who then ironically have turned their methodological position into an article of faith!

The objection to theology being an object of study in a secular university on the part of some, not all, scholars is that theology does not allow its fundamental teachings to be questioned or subjected to critical inquiry. Feuerbach would beg to differ, but he remains alone. Religious studies scholars discussing dogmas?

Perish the thought! This stance has resulted in the impoverishment of the field of religious studies and the study of theology in the Western academy. But this is not necessarily true elsewhere.

- (KF) I have directly encountered the ‘censorship’ you describe. My willingness to speak the language of theology, as it were, touched insecurities, encroached upon the edges that the religious studies field has sought to fortify for itself. I was explicitly told that transgressing the secular bounds of anthropology is better suited for the pulpit than for religious studies. Ironically, I was also told in the very same breath to provide concrete evidence of secular disciplining at work! The *JRAI*’s invitation to hold this conversation shows to me that anthropologists appear more hospitable than religious studies scholars to take seriously the claims of theology in constructing its own truth claims, as well as to take religion seriously, study it from within, as it were.

Even so, my sense is that there is a lot of work yet to be done when it comes to anthropologists opening up to theology, especially beyond its capacity to aid in the study of religion. I would like to see us daring to ask how theology can speak to our entire being or becoming. For example, what is it about theology that can prepare us, perhaps better than anthropology today, to grapple with the edge of thinking, such as engaging with a notion, to invert Descartes: ‘I think, therefore I am not?’

In the very last line of his seminal *Nuer religion* published sixty-five years ago, E.E. Evans-Pritchard announces that he arrived at the point where the theologian must ‘take over’ from the anthropologist.⁵⁴ I wonder if we anthropologists might finally be ready to ‘cross over’ ourselves, with the help of the theologian as a slayer of earthly sovereignties. I understand this ‘crossing over’ as ceasing to take as self-evident the sovereignty of thought and that of the thinking subject. To do so may require mobilizing theology’s integrative power to even fundamentally question the modern research university as it exists today.

- (EM) I appreciate your efforts to transform your discipline by posing critical questions to the field of anthropology and the academy, too. I wish to direct your attention to a concern I have as a scholar of Islam. If this issue does not arise as a problem in your work, then let me share it as my problem and your thoughts will be appreciated.

I wonder if you find anthropological research on Muslim subjects results in difficulties in explaining matters related to the field of *dīn*, unfortunately generally translated as ‘religion’. As for the term ‘religion’, it has been translated differently into multiple Islamicate languages. And modern political theologies, as well as the modern humanities and social sciences of a Western provenance, have forced Muslim intellectual traditions to internalize the category of religion knowingly and unknowingly, such that it signifies itself as distinct from, and even in opposition to, the secular or the worldly. Even in languages where the term *dīn* is retained, such as in Indonesian, Malay, and Urdu, the semiosis of the term has adjusted to the modern reality of religion as private, internal, and spiritual. While the internal and the spiritual are certainly not excluded from *dīn*, you know that they do not amount to the sum of its meanings.

In thinking of how it could be useful to secular disciplines like anthropology along the lines you describe, I have been trying to understand the category of *dīn* historically and its signification over time. In seventh-century Arabia, the Prophet Muḥammad declared that his *dīn* is similar to the *dīn* of Abraham and Moses and different from the *dīn* of the polytheists. Here *dīn* refers to a set of acts of obedience. In other words, there are acts one is required to perform in order to gain God's favour in this world and to attain salvation in the hereafter. *Dīn* also evokes that which is habitual or customary, but in the sense that the customary is binding. In other words, for that early community of Muslims, *dīn* is organically embedded into an elaborate lifeworld.

I hardly think the first hearers of the invitation to the *dīn* of Muḥammad in Arabia spent much time thinking about what it meant. *Dīn* meant a person belonged to her or his practices, habits, and way of life. The Qur'an mentions that the Prophet Muḥammad's adversaries also had their own *dīn*. Early Muslims would be surprised to learn that some modern Muslims have created a wall or a boundary within life between *dīn* and non-*dīn*, because for them *dīn* is *in* and *from* the fabric of life. But once early Muslims found themselves outside an Arabian space in other regions of the Near East and beyond, they quickly had to systematize and organize the acts of *dīn* through formal categories, especially normative categories, to clarify what constitute acts towards attaining salvation.

The idea of the secular has also raised confusion for many Muslim thinkers in the modern period. The reception of this term in contemporary Muslim societies retains the ambiguity of a more inclusive category where acts of *dīn* and acts of the world (*dunyā*) are not impermeable. They bleed into each other since life is lived in such a fluid register. I wonder what your encounters with anthropological discussions of *dīn* have taught you in trying to retain the Muslim experience of *dīn* as you reach for the crossing over to theology of which you speak.

(KF) Indeed, *dīn* is what I have been trying to come to terms with as part of the Muslim inheritance that orients my life in working in a secularly conditioned academic discipline. How, I have been asking, might *dīn*, as part of understanding what Islam is, affect what I do (and don't do) as an anthropologist?

As for anthropological research of Islam, if we 'listen' to language in the almost trivial sense, we should be readily able to discern that 'religion' as a modern category cannot possibly do 'translational justice' to *dīn*. I am thinking, for example, of how the word in Arabic, at least in its Qur'anic locution (e.g. 3:9; 3:85; 109:6), as well as the remarkable agility of the tripartite root d.a.n, means that *dīn* resonates with a way of life, a mode of comportment, law, compliance, accountability, judging, indebtedness, and so on.

Clearly 'religion', especially after Luther set it on its modern course, is incapable of allowing us to say what *dīn* has allowed to be said in the past and might still be capable of saying today. So you raise a very important question about anthropological studies of Islam, and in some ways there is where we can find the most concerted efforts to take religion seriously, to 'cross over', as it were. I am thinking especially of recent works in the anthropology of Islam and of Christianity that emerged after Talal Asad's *Formations of the secular* came out in 2003.⁵⁵ However, I am not aware of anthropological studies explicitly engaging with *dīn* per se.

Indeed, I feel that this problem cannot be sufficiently addressed if 'taking religion seriously' remains only the purview of those anthropologists who study Islam, or other religions for that matter. To the extent that all of anthropology is a kind of adventure in translation (of course producing mistranslations as well), it needs to diversify this 'seriousness'. How can 'taking religion seriously' mean more than vindicating the rationality of mostly theistic beliefs and, to a lesser extent, theistically driven practices that, typically and crucially, others whom anthropologists observe sustain, but which they do not sustain themselves? What might happen if we allow *dīn* to live again with the world, with *dunyā* and not merely within it?

Perhaps 'taking religion seriously' also means 'letting go' of it. By letting go, by surrendering, I mean a very precise thing: letting go of the need to define it, of the desire to confine it as a demarcated category. I guess I am wondering when we will be able to relinquish our need for 'ostensible definitions' of religion. Perhaps then *dīn* (Islam and others) could emerge as something greater than what the modern category 'religion' allows for. I suspect that if we let go of our desire for a kind of definition that 'apprehends' it, if we let it be, as it were, as we try to observe it as clearly and openly as possible, that is, observe the ways it lives in the daily pulses of the life of its upholders, we might in time come closer to puzzles that have been left abandoned, crucially puzzles about ourselves. Ironically, then, I have been wondering if these two disciplines – theology and anthropology (with their chequered history in the study of difference in the West) – act together, could they emancipate *dīn*/religion from the iron cage of Religion?

I see this 'emancipation' as implying that we need to be ready to explore what undoing a whole host of binary relations might entail. I am thinking of binaries that over time have gained axiomatic status precisely because *dīn*/religion was made to appear as antithetical to, rather than a cultivator of, life. If and when committed to this untethering, theology and anthropology might lead us to investigate conditions for, and consequences of, no longer pitting religion against politics, worshipping against inquiring, and reason against revelation. They could also help us refrain from severing a self's sense of freedom from its submission or its fulfilment from its 'emptiness'.

So if, say, someone like Descartes has in some sense inaugurated the ideal (or Baconian 'idol') of the modern individual whose existence hinges on thinking while sovereign, how might a joint venture of theology and anthropology not anxious to define *dīn* help us restore our learning capacities for appreciating, for example, the adage stating aporetically, to approximate the original Arabic: 'For my existence I disappear from Existence (*Wujūdī an aghība 'an al-wujūd*)'?

- (EM) I think I have faced a similar disquiet in my own encounters with secular anthropology. I have found that anthropologists in their conversation about 'religion' in the modern sense have spent a disproportionate amount of time theorizing this category, generating notions that, to my mind, place profound limits on experience, producing a very narrow vision or understanding. By contrast, there are real-life sites of Muslims practising *dīn* which could reveal an entire world of practice outside the privatized domain of 'religion'. Sometimes the contemporary Muslim practice of *dīn* is shaped by modern notions of religion imposed by state bureaucracy, laws, and cultures, but these developments cannot

contain the power of *dīn* as embedded in tradition and that to some extent remains unbridled by Western categories.

So while I appreciate your rationale for ‘untethering’ *dīn* from definitions and semantics, I am concerned that without them the category of *dīn* can get fairly nebulous. Perhaps we view this differently, but I fear we could find ourselves on a ‘slippery slope’ where everything can then be *dīn* and also nothing can be *dīn*. Definitions are important to my mind, otherwise we speak at cross-purposes. Definitions and their incarnation in language and life are neither permanent nor static, they are historical, too. I think premodern Muslims grasped the category of *dīn* fairly efficiently and effectively. I doubt *dīn* can be left to itself; it is part of the warp and woof of life and practice.

Al-Ghazālī named his magnum opus the *Revivification of the sciences of dīn* (*Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn*). He felt the need to *translate* knowledge and meaning related to obedience to God and salvation. He identified those mundane acts of life that become purposeful when undertaken in the penumbra of the light of obedience to God. He saw knowledge sought in pursuit of obedience as praiseworthy, yet blameworthy when sought in pursuit of opposite aims.

Another way of putting it is that *dīn* is relational to the embodied obedient subject. The term ‘obedience’ at the centre of *dīn* is antithetical to the modern sensibility that valorizes choice and freedom. And there has been an entire effort by modern Muslim interpreters to retranslate the term *dīn* and place the emphasis on one very remote semantic thread of ‘debt’. Often modern interpreters pursue this undertaking on very shaky historical and philological grounds. Their goal is to create a contractual relationship between subject and God, to parallel the relationship between citizen and state. Now I concede that theological concepts, too, undergo change. However, I want modern Muslims to account for this hybrid, old-new dimension as part of a historical development. And I think if anthropologists take advantage of the theological lenses I am gesturing towards, much could be gained to map the practice of *dīn* in Muslim societies and differentiate these practices from other contexts. And as you seem to indicate, should anthropology adopt this approach to *dīn* and hence to life, thinking, and learning, it could move towards the vision of that pursuit of knowledge that it appears we both, on some level, share.

NOTES

¹ These conversations include reflections upon the suitability of the terms ‘theology’ and ‘theologian’ for each context.

² See Havea (2003).

³ Jione uses the lower case when he is the subject of the first person ‘i’. For two reasons: first, because in English and Tongan the lower case is used with the second and third persons, and, second, because capitalizing the first-person singular is evidence of privileging the individual self (an ailment of modernity and of the English language).

⁴ Mead’s reputation in Sāmoa is not especially good. Tomlinson’s point here is that some of his Samoan interlocutors saw anthropology as potentially more problematic than religious affiliation or commitment.

⁵ See Havea (2011; 2014); Te Paa Daniel (2011).

⁶ See Havea (1998).

⁷ See Kirsch (2020).

⁸ Tomlinson (2020: 108).

⁹ Tofaeono (2010).

¹⁰ Havea (2021a).

- ¹¹ Havea (2021*b*).
- ¹² Havea (2021*c*).
- ¹³ Abu-Lughod (1991: 137).
- ¹⁴ Ahmed (2015).
- ¹⁵ Izutsu (1964).
- ¹⁶ Robbins (2006).
- ¹⁷ Kahn (2011).
- ¹⁸ Fountain (2013).
- ¹⁹ Messick (2018).
- ²⁰ Agrama (2012); Amster (2013); Pandolfo (2018); Rasanayagam (2011).
- ²¹ Hallaq (2009; 2011).
- ²² Williams (2008).
- ²³ Asad (1986).
- ²⁴ Hodgson (1974: 57).
- ²⁵ MacIntyre (2007).
- ²⁶ Hallaq (2019); Hashas (2020). A similar point has been made in Lahham (2015).
- ²⁷ According to the *Digital Dictionary of Buddhism*, the five aggregates (or *skandhas*) are the physical form, feelings, perception, impulse, and consciousness (<http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=%E4%BA%94%E8%98%8A>).
- ²⁸ For a Humanistic Buddhist account of the figure of the bodhisattva, see Hsing Yun (1999).
- ²⁹ For a more detailed account, refer to Makransky (2011: 119-33).
- ³⁰ Tambiah (1984: 7).
- ³¹ Hsing Yun (2016).
- ³² 'Fundamentally, then, there are no religions that are false. All are true after their own fashion: All fulfil given conditions of human existence, though in different ways' (Durkheim 1995 [1912]: 2).
- ³³ Robbins (2013).
- ³⁴ Laidlaw & Mair (2019).
- ³⁵ The Communities of Practice Sunday check-in resources can be found at <https://community.thebbep.org/2021-sunday-check-in/>.
- ³⁶ For more information, see <https://www.facebook.com/turningpointstories/>.
- ³⁷ Harvey (2000: 134).
- ³⁸ Executive Board, American Anthropological Association (1947).
- ³⁹ Laidlaw (2013: chap. 1).
- ⁴⁰ Mair & Evans (2015).
- ⁴¹ Rapport (2018).
- ⁴² Wohlleben (2016).
- ⁴³ Barrett (1968).
- ⁴⁴ Meyer (2010).
- ⁴⁵ E.g. McCauley (2013).
- ⁴⁶ Jenkins (2018).
- ⁴⁷ McKearney (2016).
- ⁴⁸ Thanks to Andreas Bandak for first orientating me towards this term.
- ⁴⁹ Cochrane (2018); Vicencio (1995).
- ⁵⁰ Ram (1992).
- ⁵¹ Douglas (2005: 107); Sahlins (2018).
- ⁵² Geertz (1974: 44).
- ⁵³ Iqbal (1960 [1930]: 154).
- ⁵⁴ Evans-Pritchard (1956: 322).
- ⁵⁵ Asad (2003).

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